The right to confidentiality of communications between a lawyer and a client during investigation of EU competition law violations: the aspect of the status of a lawyer by Nasutavičienė, Justina
ISSN 1392–6195 (print)
ISSN 2029–2058 (online)
jurISprudeNcIja
jurISprudeNce
2013, 20(1), p. 39–55.
Jurisprudencija/Jurisprudence
 Mykolo Romerio universitetas, 2013
 Mykolas Romeris University, 2013
ISSN 1392–6195 (print), ISSN 2029–2058 (online)
http://www.mruni.eu/lt/mokslo_darbai/jurisprudencija/
http://www.mruni.eu/en/mokslo_darbai/jurisprudencija/
the Right to confidentiality  
of coMMUnicationS between a lawyeR and  
a client dURing inveStigation of eU  
coMpetition law violationS: the aSpect  
of the StatUS of a lawyeR
Justina Nasutavičienė
Mykolas romeris university, Faculty of Law, 
Institute of International and european union Law 
ateities 20, LT-08303 Vilnius, Lithuania 
Telephone (+370 5) 271 4669 
e-mail: j.nasutaviciene@etd.lt
received on 19 March 2013; accepted on 20 june, 2013
Abstract. For the purposes of this article, the right to confidentiality of communications 
between a lawyer and a client (legal professional privilege) is analysed and understood as a 
rule under which, in judicial or administrative proceedings, the content of communications 
between a lawyer and his client shall not be disclosed; if this rule is breached, the content of 
the communications in question is not treated as evidence in the process. Legal professional 
privilege is related to several articles of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms. The European Court of Human Rights has found that the 
violation of the right of an accused to communicate with a lawyer without a third party 
departs from Article 6(3)(c) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms which entitles to defend oneself in person or through a legal assistant. 
This kind of communication also relates to the Article 8 of the Convention, which provides a 
right to respect for private and family life, home and correspondence.  In the opinion of  the 
European Court of Human Rights, according to the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms there is no difference if a lawyer representing a client is 
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a practitioner or not. However, when dealing with the violations of EU competition law, 
the Court of Justice of the European Union acknowledges the protection of legal professional 
privilege only with regard to the communications between an accused companies and an 
independent lawyer (who does not work for his client on an employment contract basis). 
When the protection of legal professional privilege is not granted for communications of the 
accused company  with its own legal personnel, a question may arise whether it is considered 
that sufficient level of confidentiality is ensured for these companies.  
Keywords: legal professional privilege, lawyer-client communication, EU competition 
law, European Convention on Human Rights. 
introduction 
When dealing with the violations of eu competition law, the european court of 
justice (hereinafter – ecj) holds that legal professional privilege applies not only to the 
form of correspondence with lawyers, but also to internal documents of the company that 
reflect the content of the communications with lawyers and legal advice1. In addition, 
preparatory documents, even if they were not exchanged with a lawyer or were not 
created for the purpose of being physically sent to a lawyer might be subject to legal 
professional privilege, provided that they were prepared for the sole purpose of seeking 
legal advice from a lawyer in exercise of the defence2. Nevertheless, ecj acknowledges 
the protection of legal professional privilege only for the communications between an 
accused company and an independent lawyer (who does not work for his client on an 
employment contract basis).
In this analysis, a term “lawyer” refers to advocates included in the list of the Bar 
association. as for lawyers employed by companies (or in-house lawyers), the author 
does not mean lawyers who do not hold a status of an advocate, but the same advocates 
who fall within the above-mentioned concept but who work for the client-company 
on an employment contract basis. Such an explanation is relevant for distinguishing: 
(i) “independent” lawyers, serving customers under services contracts; (ii) “in-house” 
lawyers working under employment contracts; (iii) and the company’s jurists.
In the republic of Lithuania, lawyers are forbidden to work for their clients on 
the employment contract basis, but in many eu countries this is common practice, 
therefore, a lawyer may be independent (“external” lawyer) or may work in a client 
company on the employment contract basis. It should be noted that the ecj also does 
not acknowledge the protection of a legal professional privilege for correspondence 
with non-eu Member State lawyers.
1 case T-30/89, Hilti AG v. Commission of the European Communities [1991] ECR II-01439, paras. 14−17.
2 joined cases T-125/03 and T-253/03, Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd and Akcros Chemicals Ltd v. Commission 
of the European Communities [2007] ecr II-03523, paras. 122, 123.
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Meanwhile, the european court of Human rights (hereinafter – ectHr) states 
that the right of an accused to communicate with a lawyer without a third party is 
derived from article 6(3)(c) of the convention for the protection of Human rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter – ecHr), which entitles to defend oneself in 
person or through a legal assistant. This type of communication also relates to the article 
8 of the convention, which provides for a right to respect for private and family life, 
home and correspondence. as the eu will soon become responsible for the violations 
of human rights protected by the ecHr, it is important to understand how the right 
to confidentiality of communications between a lawyer and a client is interpreted by 
the ectHr and if the exemptions from this right applied by the ecj comply with the 
standards of the ecHr.
attention needs to be drawn to the fact that in the Lithuanian legal literature, issues 
of legal professional privilege in eu competition law have not been analysed yet. 
Several foreign legal experts (christoforou, T., andreangeli, a., Gippini-Fournier, e., 
Leskinen, ch., Stefanelli, j. Vesterdorf, B., Williams, N.) have focused on this aspect, 
but they have not analysed the case-law of the ectHr with respect to legal professional 
secrecy, therefore they draw the conclusions different from those postulated by the 
author of this study.
 In the first part of this article, methods of historical analysis and case study are 
employed to analyse the case-law of the ectHr with respect to legal professional 
secrecy, to highlight the standard of security applied by this court, and to draw the 
attention to the assessment by the court of the limits of this right and its possible 
restrictions. In the second part of this article, methods of historical analysis, case study 
and descriptive methods are applied to analyse the case-law of the ecj with respect 
to legal professional secrecy in eu competition law cases, by drawing attention to 
the interpretation given by the court of the aims and purposes of limitations to legal 
professional privilege. In the third part of this article, logic-analytical and comparative 
methods are used to analyse the scope of legal professional privilege recognised by the 
ecj, attention is drawn to the assessment of such practice in existing legal literature, 
and a new criterion for the test usable to avoid possible abuse of this right is proposed.
1. legal professional privilege in the case-law of the european 
court of human Rights
Traditionally, legal professional privilege, namely the right not to disclose the 
content of lawyer-client communications to third parties and the arbitrator in legal 
proceedings was considered to be an integral part of the lawyer-client communications 
confidentiality and, generally speaking, has gained practical and fundamental rights-
based interpretation. prohibition to disclose the content of such communications is 
recognised as an essential element to ensure the client‘s possibility to communicate 
openly with a counsel to ensure the effectiveness of legal assistance. Therefore, it is 
assumed that legal professional privilege was designed to ensure the effectiveness 
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of administration of justice. Meanwhile, according to the fundamental rights-based 
approach, such legal professional privilege is regarded as “a right to confidentiality 
afforded to the client”, derived from the client’s right to a fair trial.3   
The right to confidentiality of communications between a lawyer and his client 
is not explicitly enshrined in the provisions of the ecHr. according to the european 
court of Human rights, if a person is not entitled to legal aid, an infringement of 
the right of access to a court (article 6(1)) is recognised.4 In S v. Switzerland it was 
highlighted that the right to communicate with one’s advocate out of hearing of a third 
person was part of the basic requirements of a fair trial in a democratic society and 
followed from article 6(3)(c) of the convention5. If a lawyer were unable to confer 
with his client and receive confidential instructions from him without such surveillance, 
his assistance would lose much of its usefulness, whereas the convention was intended 
to guarantee the rights that were practical and effective6. 
The european court of Human rights also bases the right to professional secrecy 
on article 8 of the ecHr. In Kopp v. Switzerland the applicant had challenged the 
permit of the state authorities to eavesdrop on to his law office and his private telephone 
conversations, even though the permit clearly stated that his professional calls (acting 
as an advocate) will not be taken into account. It should be noted that the applicant 
was not a suspect in the ongoing investigation. In the ectHr‘s view, attorney-client 
communication confidentiality is regarded as a sensitive area, which directly concerns 
the rights of the defence7 and it is clear that telephone calls made from or to business 
premises, such as those of a law firm, may be covered by the notions of “private life” 
and “correspondence” within the meaning of article 8(1) of the ecHr8.
In deciding on the issues pertaining to the restrictions of lawyer and client 
confidentiality, ECtHR considers that the right to legal professional privilege is not 
absolute9. Interference with this right may be lawful if it is in accordance with the 
law10, has an aim or aims that is/are legitimate under article 8(2) of the ecHr and is 
necessary in a democratic society in order to attain the aforesaid aim or aims.11 
3 Gippini-Fournier, e. Legal professional priviledge in competition proceedings before the european 
commission. In: International Antitrust Law & Policy: Fordham Corporate Law. 2004, p. 970, 980, 982, 
966. also Williams, N. Four questions of privilege: the litigation aspect of legal professional privilege. 
Civil Justice Quarterly. 1990, 9: 139 at 141.
4 Golder v. United Kingdom, 21 February 1975, Series a no. 18.
5 This provision provides that everyone charged with a criminal offense may defend himself or through le-
gal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has insufficient means to pay, and where the interests of justice 
so require, receive free legal assistance.
6 S. v. Switzerland, 28 November 1991, §48, a220. 
7 Kopp v. Switzerland, 25 March 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-II, § 74.
8 ecHr referred to its judgments in Halford v. United Kingdom, and, mutatis mutandis, Niemietz v. 
Germany.
9 Campbell v. United Kingdom, 25 March 1992, Series a No. 233.
10 Ibid., §37. ECtHR holds that although the phrase “in accordance with the law” refers in the first place to 
national law, it is not, in principle, for the court to examine the validity of secondary legislation. This is 
primarily a matter which falls within the competence of national courts. 
11 Ibid., § 34.
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When analysing the first aspect, the ECtHR examines whether the act was available 
to the person in question, it also pays attention to the quality of legislation, such as 
whether the law is clear, or the scope of protection is clear, and whether from the legal 
rule a person can foresee the consequences of the violation of that law.12 The ectHr 
also verifies if the legal rule (in particular if a search and seizure is at stake) protects an 
individual against arbitrary interference with the guarantees protected by article 8 of 
the convention13. 
For example, in Sallinen and others v. Finland a lawyer suspected of a serious crime 
challenged the legality of the search in his office. Computer hard drives, which included 
information about the applicant’s communication with customers, who never had any 
connection with the crime, had been recovered, copied and seized. Although the seized 
hard drives were returned to him, a copy of one disk was stored at the police for some 
time. The ectHr stated that the measures undertaken in this case were implemented 
without adequate legal safeguards – the court was shocked that in pursuance of such 
broad search and seizure, there was no independent or judicial oversight. Even if it 
would be possible to recognise that national law enshrined a general legal basis for the 
implementation of such measures, in the absence of precise regulation on the conditions 
under which privileged material might be subject to search or seizure, there was no 
guarantee of a minimum level of protection ensured in a democratic society14.
In Stefanov v. Bulgaria, which is also relevant to search and seizure in a lawyer‘s 
office15, the ectHr stated that it was not clear from national law, whether it prohibited 
the removal of material covered by legal professional privilege under all circumstances. 
It is therefore open to doubt whether the search and seizure were “in accordance with 
the law”.16 It was reminded that the ectHr must also review the manner in which the 
search has been executed, and – where a lawyer’s office is concerned – whether it has 
been carried out in the presence of an independent observer to ensure that material 
subject to legal professional privilege is not removed.17 
12 Kopp v. Switzerland, supra note 9, § 55–75 and Foxley v. United Kingdom, No. 33274/96, § 31–47.
13 Petri Sallinen and others v. Finland, No. 50882/99, § 82.
14 Ibid., § 89, 92.
15 Iliya Stefanov v. Bulgaria, 65755/01. upon arrival at the police station to represent his arrested client, 
an applicant, who was a lawyer, was questioned on the topic of investigated crime. Within an hour the 
applicant’s office door was sealed, and the officer responsible for the case went to court asking for a search 
warrant and without giving further details simply stated that on the basis of the available evidence it was 
reasonable to assume that the objects and documents relevant for the investigation could be found in the 
applicant’s office. A search warrant was issued and executed on the same day. The search was launched 
when the applicant was still absent and was monitored by two witnesses – the applicant’s neighbours. 
Applicant’s computer, printer and other devices, 33 floppy disks and other documents were seized. On 
the other hand, the court did not consider it necessary to address this question because it recognised these 
measures as incompatible with article 8 of the convention in other respects.
16 On the other hand, the Court did not consider it necessary to address this question because he recognised 
these measures incompatible with article 8 of the convention in other respects. Iliya Stefanov v. Bulgaria, 
supra note 20, para. 36.
17 Ibid., § 38.
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However, the court noted that neither the application for its issue nor the warrant 
itself specified what items and documents were expected to be found in the applicant’s 
office, or how they would be relevant to the investigation. Moreover, in issuing the 
warrant, the judge did not touch at all upon the issue of whether privileged material was 
to be removed. according to the ectHr’s case-law, search warrants have to be drafted, 
as far as practicable, in a manner calculated to keep their impact within reasonable 
bounds18. It has been highlighted that this is all the more important in cases where the 
premises searched are the office of a lawyer, which as a rule contains material that is 
subject to legal professional privilege. Therefore, it was found that, in the circumstances, 
the warrant was drawn in overly broad terms and was thus not capable of minimising 
the interference with the applicant’s article 8 rights and his professional secrecy19. 
The Court further observed that the warrant’s excessive breadth was reflected in 
the way in which it was executed. While there is nothing in the facts to suggest that 
papers covered by legal professional privilege were touched upon during the search, 
it was noted that the police removed the applicant’s entire computer, including its 
peripherals, as well as all floppy disks which they found in his office. Seeing that the 
computer was evidently being used by the applicant for his work, it was natural to 
suppose that its hard drive, as well as the floppy disks, contained material which was 
covered by legal professional privilege. The ectHr noted that it was true that later the 
expert used keywords to sift through the data they contained, which somewhat limited 
the intrusion. However, this happened several days after the search, after the computer 
and the floppy disks had been indiscriminately removed from the applicant’s office, 
whereas no safeguards existed to ensure that during the intervening period the entire 
contents of the hard drive and the floppy disks were not inspected or copied. This led 
the court to conclude that the search impinged on the applicant’s professional secrecy 
to an extent that was disproportionate in the circumstances20.
In addition, the ectHr noted that, while the search was carried out in the presence 
of two certifying witnesses, they were neighbours who were not legally qualified. The 
Court considered this issue problematic, as this lack of legal qualification made it highly 
unlikely that these observers were truly capable of identifying, independently of the 
investigation team, which materials were covered by legal professional privilege, with 
the result that they did not provide an effective safeguard against excessive intrusion by 
the police into the applicant’s professional secrecy. This was especially true in respect 
of the electronic data seized by the police, as it did not seem that any sort of sifting 
procedure was followed during the search21.
In Sorvisto v. Finland, the applicant complained of the breach of article 8 of the 
ECHR, because the applicant’s correspondence with an attorney was seized during 
the search. ectHr relied on the recommendation of the committee of Ministers rec 
(2000)21, under which the States should take all necessary measures to ensure the 
18 ecHr referred to its judgment in Van Rossem v. Belgium.
19 Iliya Stefanov v. Bulgaria, § 41.
20 Ibid., § 42.
21 Ibid., § 43.
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confidentiality of client and lawyer communications22 and found that, even if it could 
be assumed that national law provided a general legal basis for the measures under 
consideration, nevertheless it was not enough to clearly specify the circumstances under 
which a legal professional privilege protected material could be confiscated. Therefore, 
the applicant was deprived of the minimum level of protection, guaranteed in a law of 
the democratic society23.
When considering the necessity of interference within the legal professional 
privilege, the ectHr examines whether an interference corresponds to a pressing social 
need and, in particular, that it is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. Such 
legitimate objectives include national security, public safety or the economic well-
being of the country, prevention of disorder or crime, protection of health or morals, or 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.24 
In Smirnov v. Russia, the Court held that during the search and seizure of a lawyer‘s 
office the applicant25 was not granted any protection with regard to his legal professional 
privilege, for example, the prohibition of confiscation of documents protected by a 
lawyer-client communications privilege or the participation of an independent overseer 
in the search who, regardless of the investigation team, could identify the documents 
protected by professional secrecy. Given the nature of the documents seized, in 
the ectHr’s view, this level of infringement of professional secrecy could not be 
proportionate to any legitimate purpose.26
In Foxley v. United Kingdom, the applicant complained that his correspondence, 
including correspondence with his legal advisers, was examined at the post 
office following orders of Trustee in Bankruptcy. The ECtHR has pointed out that 
the implementation by authorities of the measures against an applicant must be 
accompanied by adequate and effective safeguards that ensure minimum impairment 
of the right to respect his correspondence. This is particularly true where, as in the 
case at issue, correspondence with the bankrupt’s legal advisers may be intercepted. 
The court noted in this connection that the lawyer-client relationship is, in principle, 
privileged and correspondence in that context, whatever its purpose, concerns matters 
of a private and confidential nature27. The court found that there was no pressing social 
need for the opening, reading and copying to file of the applicant’s correspondence 
with his legal advisers and that, accordingly, the interference was not “necessary in a 
democratic society” within the meaning of article 8 § 228. This case is also significant 
22 Sorvisto v. Finland, No. 19348/04, §114.
23 Ibid., § 120.
24 article 8(2), convention on Human rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
25 The applicant complained that he represented three persons in the same case, and although any allegations 
had not been brought against him, his home and office was searched, computer and documents (including 
those which have relevance in other civil cases, quite apart from the investigated case) were seized.
26 Smirnov v. Russia, No. 71362/01, § 46−48. 
27 Foxley v. United Kingdom, supra note 12, § 43.
28 Ibid., § 46.
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for another reason – it has shown that the ectHr recognises legal protection privilege 
for correspondence with legal advisers who do not have the status of an advocate.  
The striking case in this context is AB v. the Netherlands, in which the applicant 
complained that prison administration was examining his correspondence with the legal 
trustee, protected by legal professional privilege29. In response to the allegations, the 
Government stated that the prison staff did not know that the legal trustee represented 
the applicant of the complaint to the european commission of Human rights, in 
addition, this person was a former convict who served his sentence in the same prison, 
and the prison rules applicable at the time forbade prisoners’ correspondence with 
former prisoners30. and although it was not disputed that the applicant’s legal trustee 
had not been registered as an advocate at all, the ECtHR stated briefly and clearly 
that neither the convention nor the rules of procedure of the european commission 
of Human rights at the material time required the representatives of applicants to be 
practising lawyers31.    
As can be seen from the ECtHR case-law, confidentiality of a lawyer-client 
relationship is recognised as to the rights of the defence-related sensitive area32, the 
interference into which, according to the facts of the case, can be considered as a violation 
of the right to a fair trial or the right to privacy. The court considers that the lawyer-
client communications are privileged and correspondence in that context, whatever 
its purpose, is private and confidential. In addition, the protection applies not only to 
correspondence with lawyers, but also to one with jurists: neither the convention nor 
the previously applicable rules of the european Human rights commission required 
that the clients’ representatives should be practicing lawyers33. 
Another important aspect is that the ECtHR requires that searches and seizures are 
supervised independently or by judicial review and precisely regulated, for instance, 
the conditions under which the material protected by legal professional privilege may 
be subject to search or seizure must be enshrined34, and therefore, when issuing a search 
warrant it is very important to clarify the possibility of seizure of the material protected 
by professional secrecy35, meaning that search warrant cannot merely give the right 
to seek “objects and documents significant for the investigation”, giving investigators 
the right to decide for themselves what exactly is “significant for the investigation”36. 
In other words, the scope of the legislation must accurately and clearly set out the 
29 despite the fact that a criminal case he was represented by two advocates, the applicant had appointed in 
writing a familiar person (who was not an advocate), a “true and legitimate lawyer-trustee” on his behalf 
to exercise certain powers in the criminal case.
30 A.B. v. Netherlands, No. 37328/97, § 77. 
31 Ibid., § 85−88.
32 Kopp v. Switzerland, supra note 7, §74.
33 Foxley v.United Kingdom, supra note 12, § 43; A.B. v. Netherlands, supra note 30, § 85−88.
34 Petri Sallinen and othersv v. Finland,  supra note 13, § 89, 92.
35 ecHr referred to its judgment Van Rossem v. Belgium.
36 Aleksanyan v. Russia, No. 46468/06, § 214, 216, 217.
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conditions under which privileged material may be subject to search or seizure37, in 
addition, when deciding on the relevant interferences, national courts must take into 
account the terms and conditions set out in the legal norms.
There is no evidence to suggest that this strict approach of the ectHr regarding 
the seizure of documents protected by legal professional secrecy would be different if 
a lawyer was not a member of the Bar.
2. limits of professional Secrecy in the eU competition  
case-law: lawyer’s Status 
council regulation (ec) No 1/2003 of 16 december 2002 on the implementation 
of the rules on competition laid down in articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty38 contains 
no provision for the protection of secrecy of the accused company’s communications 
with lawyers. There was no such provision in regulation No 17: First regulation 
implementing articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty39 either, although the european 
parliament had recommended establishing that documents and information protected 
by legal professional privilege should have immunity from forced disclosure40. On 
the other hand, it does not mean that during investigations of eu competition law 
violations the confidentiality of communications between companies and their lawyers 
is not protected at all: in 1978, in its reply to the parliamentary question on the legal 
protection of documents the commission stated that, while such protection was not 
provided for in regulation 17/62, the commission should take a number of national 
competition laws into account and was not going to regard strictly legal documents 
drawn up in order to get or give an opinion on legal issues, or preparing and planning 
for the defence as evidence of EU competition law infringement. On the other hand, 
in its view, to assess whether the document can be stored, is the prerogative of the 
commission, which can be inspected by the ecj41. Nevertheless, since 1982 the 
european union courts consistently refer to this right. 
already in 1982, in AM&S the ecj held that legal professional privilege applied 
only to company’s correspondence with independent lawyers, rather than employment-
related jurists42. The requirement of an independent status of the lawyer was based on 
a concept of the lawyer‘s role as collaborating in the administration of justice by the 
courts and as being required to provide in full independence, and in the overriding 
37 Petri Sallinen and others v. Finland, supra note 13, § 89, 92.
38 OJ 2003 L 1, p. 1.
39 OJ 1962, 13, p. 204. English special edition: Series I Volume 1959.
40 Deringer Report. Doc. 104/1960-61, § 85−88.
41 Question of Mr. Cousté to the European Commission No. 63/78, OJ C 188/30 (1978). Vesterdorf, B., Legal 
professional privilege and the privilege against Self-Incrimination in ec Law: recent developments and 
current Issues. Fordham International Law Journal. 2004, 28, p. 1184.
42 case 155/79, AM&S Europe Limited v. Commission of the European Communities [1982] ecr 1575, § 
18−21.
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interests of that cause, such legal assistance as the client needs. It was said that the 
counterpart of that protection lied in the rules of professional ethics and discipline, laid 
down and enforced in the general interest by institutions endowed with the requisite 
powers for that purpose. Such a conception reflects legal traditions common to the 
Member States and is also to be found in the legal order of the community.43 The 
ecj has also held that the protection of legal professional privilege with regard to 
correspondence with non-eu Member State lawyers does not apply.44 after more than 
20 years, when Akzo case was in front of the ecj, general advocate j. Kokott gave 
brief reasons for such treatment45. In her opinion, unlike in the relationship between 
the Member States, in the relationship with third countries there is, generally speaking, 
no adequate basis for mutual recognition of legal qualifications and obligations of 
professional ethics to which lawyers are subject in the exercise of their profession. In 
many cases, it would not even be possible to ensure that the third country in question has 
a sufficiently established rule-of-law tradition which would enable lawyers to exercise 
their profession in an independent manner required and thus to perform their role as 
collaborators in the administration of justice. It cannot be the task of the commission 
or the courts of the european union to verify, at considerable expense, that this is 
the case on each occasion by reference to the rules and practices in force in the third 
country concerned, particularly since there is no guarantee that there will be an efficient 
system of administrative cooperation with the authorities of the third country on every 
occasion46.
although in its order on the appointment of interim measures the president of 
the court of First Instance noted that the applicant and the interveners had presented 
arguments that, in his opinion, at first glance, could justify a broader interpretation of 
legal professional privilege47, the court of First Instance rejected that approach.
43 Ibid., § 24.
44 Ibid., § 25−26.
45 case c-550/07 p, Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd and Akcros Chemicals Ltd v. European Commission [2010] 
I-08301, Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, 29 April 2010, § 60–61.
46 Ibid., § 190.
47 He acknowledged that principles developed in the AM&S judgment were based on at that time current 
professional ethical rules, which might have already been changed. The president pointed out that 
the parties of the case presented evidence that, since 1982, a number of Member States adopted rules 
designed to protect written communications with a lawyer employed by an undertaking on a permanent 
basis, provided that he was subject to certain rules of professional conduct. Overall, after considering 
the presented evidence, the president has concluded that the evidence tends to show that increasingly 
in the legal orders of the Member States and possibly, as a consequence, in the community legal order, 
there is no presumption that the link of employment between a lawyer and an undertaking will always, 
and as a matter of principle, affect the independence necessary for the effective exercise of the role of 
collaborating in the administration of justice by the courts if, in addition, the lawyer is bound by strict rules 
of professional conduct, which where necessary require that he observe the particular duties commensurate 
with his status.
 In his opinion, it must therefore be held that the applicants and the interveners have presented arguments 
which are not wholly unfounded and which are apt to justify raising again the complex question of 
the circumstances in which written communications with a lawyer employed by an undertaking on a 
permanent basis may possibly be protected by professional privilege, provided that the lawyer is subject 
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First, the court of First Instance refused to accept the company’s argument that 
because of recent trends in the Member States’ legal systems it was necessary to revise 
previous practice, stating that although the applicants and some of the interveners were 
right to assert that the role of corporate lawyers and communications with such lawyers 
under legal professional privilege was relatively more common now than when the 
judgment in AM&S was handed down, it was not possible, nevertheless, to identify 
tendencies that were uniform or had clear majority support in that regard in the laws of 
the Member States.48 
Then, on the argument that it is necessary to review the judgment in AM&S 
because of the eu competition law developments, the court of First Instance noted 
that the modernisation of competition law did not necessarily mean that the respective 
roles of outside lawyers and in-house lawyers had changed substantially in this respect 
since the judgment in AM&S. In any event, since community competition law is aimed 
at undertakings, in the opinion of the court, it would not be permissible, in principle, 
for purely internal communications within a particular undertaking to fall outside the 
commission’s investigatory powers, with the exception, as has been stated above, of 
notes which do no more than report the text or the content of communications with 
outside lawyers containing legal advice, and of preparatory documents drawn up 
exclusively in order to seek legal advice from an outside lawyer in exercise of the 
rights of defence.49
as regards the arguments of the applicants and of certain interveners to the effect 
that differential treatment of in-house lawyers in AM&S is contrary to the principle 
of equal treatment and raises problems from the point of view of the free movement 
of services and the freedom of establishment, the court of First Instance has noted 
that it is settled case-law that the principle of equal treatment is infringed only where 
comparable situations are treated differently or different situations are treated in the 
same way, unless such difference in treatment is objectively justified. The Court 
pointed out, however, that in-house lawyers and outside lawyers were clearly in very 
different situations, owing, in particular, to the functional, structural and hierarchical 
integration of in-house lawyers within the companies that employed them. accordingly, 
no infringement of the principle of equal treatment arises from the fact of treating such 
professionals differently in respect of protection under legal professional privilege. 
Moreover, as regards the applicants’ claim as to the harm which might be caused to the 
free movement of services and the freedom of establishment by restricting the personal 
to rules of professional conduct equivalent to those imposed on an independent lawyer. joined cases 
T-125/03 r and T-253/03 r, Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd and Akcros Chemicals Ltd v. Commission of the 
European Communities. [2003] ecr II-04771, § 122–127.
48 judgment of the court of First Instance of 17 September 2007. Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd and Akcros 
Chemicals Ltd v. Commission of the European Communities. joined cases T-125/03 and T-253/03. euro-
pean court reports 2007. page II-03523, § 170.
49 Ibid., § 172, 173.
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scope of protection of confidentiality, in the Court‘s view, it suffices to say that this 
claim has not been substantiated50. 
The applicants also claimed that, since the correspondence in question was protected 
under their respective national laws, community law should also afford them such 
protection under legal professional privilege. It was also maintained that the personal 
scope of the Community concept of confidentiality should be governed by national 
law. In that respect, the court of First Instance recalled that the protection of legal 
professional privilege was an exception to the commission’s powers of investigation. 
Therefore, the protection directly affects the conditions under which the commission 
may act in a field as vital to the functioning of the common market as that of compliance 
with the rules on competition. For those reasons, the court of justice and the court of 
First Instance have been at pains to develop a community concept of legal professional 
privilege. In the opinion of the court, the argument of the applicants and the interveners 
is at odds both with the development of that community concept and with the uniform 
application of the commission’s powers in the common market and must therefore be 
rejected.51
The applicants appealed to the ECJ, but the latter confirmed that no predominant 
trend towards protection under legal professional privilege of communications within 
a company or group with in-house lawyers might be discerned in the legal systems of 
the 27 Member States of the european union. The ecj therefore considered that the 
legal situation in the Member States of the european union had not evolved, since the 
judgment in AM&S was delivered, to an extent that would justify a change in the case-
law and recognition for in-house lawyers of the benefit of legal professional privilege52.
The ECJ has also confirmed that despite the fact that he may be enrolled with a 
Bar or Law Society and that he is subject to a certain number of professional ethical 
obligations, an in-house lawyer does not enjoy a level of professional independence 
equal to that of external lawyers. That difference in terms of independence is still 
significant, even though the national legislature seeks to treat in-house lawyers in the 
same way as external lawyers. after all, such equal treatment relates only to the formal 
act of admitting an in-house lawyer to a Bar or Law Society and the professional ethical 
obligations incumbent on him as a result of such admission. On the other hand, in the 
ecj‘s view, that legislative framework does not alter the economic dependence and 
personal identification of a lawyer in an employment relationship with his undertaking.53
The ecj has stated that the concept of independence of lawyers is determined 
not only positively, that is by reference to professional ethical obligations, but also 
negatively, by the absence of an employment relationship. an in-house lawyer, despite 
his enrolment with a Bar or Law Society and the professional ethical obligations to 
which he is, as a result, subject, does not enjoy the same degree of independence 
from his employer as a lawyer working in an external law firm does in relation to 
50 Ibid., § 174.
51 Ibid., § 176.
52 Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd and Akcros Chemicals Ltd, c‑550/07 P, § 74−76.
53 Ibid., § 56−59.
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his client. consequently, an in-house lawyer is less able to deal effectively with any 
conflicts between his professional obligations and the aims of his client. In the Court‘s 
view, an in-house lawyer cannot, whatever guarantees he has in the exercise of his 
profession, be treated in the same way as an external lawyer, because he occupies 
the position of an employee which, by its very nature, does not allow him to ignore 
the commercial strategies pursued by his employer, and thereby affects his ability to 
exercise professional independence.54 
3. The assessment of the lawyer’s Status as a Restriction of legal 
professional privilege
The eu case-law, recognising legal professional privilege only in respect of 
“external” lawyers has been assessed ambiguously in legal literature. For example, it 
was argued that in fact certain guarantee of objectivity should be required from in-house 
lawyers, because such a lawyer economically depending on his employer normally 
carries out the latter‘s instructions, therefore may be forced to argue that some of the 
documents are prepared for the realisation of the rights of defence even though such a 
statement may not correspond to reality55.
This argument cannot be totally rejected, but it cannot be confirmed either that 
the absence of an employment relationship (the independence of “external” lawyers) 
warrants another outcome of the above-mentioned situation. It may be argued that 
particularly client’s permanent status can often trigger the willingness of a lawyer to 
adopt any useful information for the client. a company which does not have its own legal 
department but handles all its legal matters to an independent lawyer, one could say, 
in essence employs him as a company’s permanent legal advisor. The only difference 
is that in such case a lawyer can serve several companies that “have employed him” in 
such a way, but an “in-house” lawyer will typically have only one employer. Therefore, 
it cannot be denied that an independent lawyer providing services for his permanent 
client will have less interest in the execution of client’s orders than a lawyer bound by 
employment contract. a criterion of “null and void” could be called  upon for assuring 
independence if, for example, a lawyer is not formally employed by a company, i. e. if 
he is not bound by the employment contract but the company would be his only (or at 
least the main) client.
and vice versa – an in-house lawyer does not necessarily carry out his functions 
strictly dependent on his employer’s orders. His contract of employment may have 
54 Ibid., § 45−47.
55 Leskinen, ch. An evaluation of the rights of defense during antitrust inspections in the light of the 
case-law of the ECTHR: would the accession of the European Union to the ECHR bring about a 
significant change? [interactive] [accessed on 27-06-2011]. <http://globalcampus.ie.edu/webes/servicios/
descarga_sgd_intranet/envia_doc.asp?id=9697&nombre=accesodatosdocumentIe.documento.
pdf&clave=WpLS10-04>.
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a condition of independence and disobedience, or he may be entitled to have more 
clients, which undoubtedly would reduce its dependence on a single employer.
a. andreangeli suggested that the test for the protection of legal professional 
privilege used in AM&S judgment should be replaced by a more flexible one, which 
would suggest an answer according to the fact whether in a concrete case a lawyer was 
bound by the binding rules, which ensured his integrity and independence, despite the 
character of his relationship with the client (i.e. whether the company is his employer 
or client).56     
Meanwhile, the European Court of Human Rights finds that for the purposes of 
the convention, there is no difference whether the person representing a client is a 
practicing lawyer or not57. according to this position, protection of legal professional 
privilege should apply not only to independent lawyers or in-house lawyers, but also 
to company’s jurists. presumably, it would be quite logical, bearing in mind the ecj’s 
judgment in AM&S58, which was reaffirmed by the Court of First Instance in Akzo59, 
stating that that EU law should be interpreted as protecting confidentiality of lawyer-
client communications if they communicate for the purpose of the client’s rights of 
defence. This means that if the company claims that the documents, which commission 
seeks to evaluate, are made up for the purpose of the company’s defence, then they 
should be covered by legal professional privilege even despite the fact that it is the 
company’s written correspondence with its jurists. Namely, not the status of a lawyer 
but the purpose (or aim) of the document should be a decisive factor in deciding on the 
issue of lawyer-client confidentiality protection.
In summary, with regard to a possibility for companies accused of eu 
competition law violations to rely on the protection of confidentiality of lawyer-
client communications, the following conclusions can be made: it is doubtful whether 
professional secrecy constraints recognised by the ecj can be considered proportionate 
to the declared objective. Given the fact that the ectHr recognises the protection of 
legal professional privilege even for those who are not practicing lawyers, it is doubtful 
whether this court would agree that for ensuring the independence of lawyers it is 
necessary to refuse recognition of legal professional privilege for lawyers employed 
by his client on an employment contract basis. It may be assumed that professional 
independence could be assured by drawing attention to the content of the document 
which the company does not want to grant access to, rather than the mere status of a 
lawyer. In such way, the purpose of this restriction would be achieved by less restrictive 
means, i.e. in a more proportionate way.
56 andreangeli, a. The protection of Legal professional privilege in eu Law and the Impact of the rules on 
the exchange of Information within the european competition Network on the Secrecy of communications 
between Lawyer and client: one step forward, two steps back? Competition Law Review. 2005, 2(1), p. 42.
57 Nikula v. Finland, No. 31611/96, ecHr 2002-II, § 53; also A.B. v. Netherlands, supra note 30, § 82−83.
58 AM&S Europe Limited, supra note 42, § 21, 22 ir 27.
59 Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd, supra note 2, § 117.
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conclusions
1. Confidentiality of a lawyer-client relationship is recognised by the ECtHR with 
regard to the rights of the defence-related sensitive area, the interference in which, 
according to the facts of the case, can be considered as violation of the right to a fair 
trial or the right to privacy. The protection applies not only for correspondence with 
lawyers, but also for one with jurists.
2. The ECtHR is very strict with the requirement that searches and seizures are 
supervised independently or by judicial review and that the conditions under which 
the material protected under legal professional privilege may be subject to search or 
seizure are precisely regulated. There is no material to suggest that strict approach of 
the ECtHR regarding the seizure of documents protected by legal professional secrecy 
would differ depending on the status of a lawyer.
3. as far as the ecj recognises that eu law should be interpreted as protecting 
confidentiality of lawyer-client communications if they communicate for the purpose 
of the client’s rights of defence, not the status of a lawyer but the purpose (or aim) of 
the document should be a decisive factor in determining on the issue of protection of 
lawyer-client confidentiality in EU competition law cases.
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Žmogaus Teisių Teismas laiko, kad kaltinamojo teisės bendrauti su advokatu nedalyvau-
jant trečiajam asmeniui ribojimas neatitinka Žmogaus teisių ir pagrindinių laisvių apsaugos 
konvencijos 6 straipsnio 3 dalies c punkto, kuris įtvirtina teisę gintis pačiam arba padedant 
savo paties pasirinktam gynėjui arba, jei asmuo neturi pakankamai lėšų gynėjui atsilyginti 
ir, kai tai reikalinga teisingumo interesams, nemokamai gauti advokato pagalbą,  reikalavi-
mų. Toks advokato ir kliento bendravimo konfidencialumo reikalavimas taip pat susijęs su 
Konvencijos 8 straipsniu, kuris suteikia teisę į tai, kad būtų gerbiamas jo privatus ir šeimos 
gyvenimas, būsto neliečiamybė ir susirašinėjimo slaptumas. Europos Žmogaus Teisių Teismo 
nuomone, atsižvelgiant į Žmogaus teisių ir pagrindinių laisvių apsaugos konvencijos tikslus, 
nėra jokio skirtumo, ar klientui atstovaujantis asmuo yra praktikuojantis advokatas, ar ne. 
Tuo tarpu Europos Sąjungos Teisingumo Teismas bylose dėl Europos Sąjungos konkurencijos 
teisės pažeidimų pripažįsta, kad advokato ir  kliento bendravimo konfidencialumo paslaptis 
taikytina tik dokumentams su advokatu, kuris nedirba kaltinamoje įmonėje pagal darbo 
sutartį. Kai profesinės paslapties apsauga nėra pripažįstama ES konkurencijos teisės pažeidi-
mu kaltinamos įmonės korespondencijai gynybos klausimais su jos teisės skyriaus personalu, 
keltinas klausimas, ar tokiu atveju tinkamai užtikrinama tokių įmonių teisė į advokato ir 
kliento bendravimo konfidencialumą.
Reikšminiai žodžiai: advokato ir kliento bendravimo konfidencialumas, profesinė pa-
slaptis, ES konkurencijos teisė, Žmogaus teisių ir pagrindinių laisvių apsaugos konvencija.
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